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Abstract. We propose a novel ontological analysis of relations and relationships 
based on a re-visitation of a classic problem in the practice of knowledge repre-
sentation and conceptual modeling, namely relationship reification. Our idea is 
that a relation holds in virtue of a relationship's existence. Relationships are 
therefore truthmakers of relations. In this paper we present a general theory or 
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from the context (the scene) they occur in. 
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1. Introduction 
In a recent paper [1], building on previous work by Guizzardi [2] on the notion of 
'relator', we proposed an ontological analysis of relations and relationships based on 
the re-visitation of a classic problem in the practice of conceptual modeling, namely 
relationships reification. First, we argued that a relationship is not a tuple (i.e., an or-
dered set of objects), but rather an object in itself, that needs to exist in the world in 
order for a relation to hold: relations hold (that is, relational propositions are true) in 
virtue of the existence of a relationship; relationships are therefore truthmakers1 of 
relations (more exactly, they are truthmakers of relational propositions). Then, con-
sidering the ontological nature of such truthmakers, we dismissed the idea (suggested 
by an early Chen's paper [3]) that they are events2, proposing instead to consider rela-
tionships similarly to objects that can genuinely change in time. Yet, we acknowl-
edged that reifying relationships as events may make a lot of sense in several practical 
cases, especially when there is no need to take change aspects into account. 
 In this paper we maintain our position that relationships are similar to objects, but 
we discuss the interplay between events and relationships in more detail. In short, the 
                                                            
1The notion of truthmaking will be further discussed and refined. 
2 For the time being, we are using here the term 'event' in its most general sense, as a synonym 
of what in the DOLCE ontology are called perdurants (note that also states and processes are 
considered as perdurants). In the rest of the paper, we propose a more restricted notion of event. 
In G. Adorni, S. Cagnoni, M. Gori, M. Maratea (eds), Advances in Artificial Intel-
ligence: Proceedings of the 15th International Conference of the Italian Associa-
tion for Artificial Intelligence. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Springer Ver-
lag 2016, pp. 237-249 
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need to have events (in addition to relationships) in the domain of discourse is moti-
vated by the fact that, when we describe the dynamics of a single relationship, we 
may want to add details concerning its spatiotemporal context, i.e., the scene that 
hosts the relationship (which may involve many other relationships); conversely, 
when we describe a complex scene, we may want to focus on a single relationship 
that is present in the scene. Indeed, as we shall see, we propose a view according to 
which events emerge from scenes as a result of a cognitive process that focuses on 
relationships: relationships are therefore the focus of events, which in turn can be seen 
as manifestations of relationships. So, referring to the relationship (which maintains 
its identity during the event) is unavoidable when we need to describe what changes 
in time, while referring to the event is unavoidable when we need to describe contex-
tual aspects that go beyond the relationship itself. For instance, consider the classic 
example of a works-for relation holding between an employee and a company: we 
may refer to a particular employment relationship while describing how duties and 
claims (say, concerning the salary) vary in time, while we refer to one or more events 
while talking, say, of the location where the work occurs, or the weekly schedule or 
the activities performed in the framework of the work agreement. 
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the key notions of re-
ification and truthmaking. First we characterize the class of relations that deserve be-
ing reified by revisiting Guizzardi's earlier distinction between formal and material 
relations and isolating the class of descriptive relations, which hold in virtue of some 
qualities of their relata. Then we introduce the notion of weak truthmaker, and, gener-
alizing our analysis to the case of descriptive properties (monadic descriptive rela-
tions) we show how individual qualities such as those adopted in the DOLCE and 
UFO ontologies can be understood as their reifications. In Section 3 we discuss the 
crucial case of the reification of comparative relations, treated in an unsatisfactory 
manner in the earlier Guizzardi's work. In section 4, we shift our attention to events, 
discussing the interplay between events and relationships, and arguing that relation-
ships are the focus of events. Finally, in Section 5 we present our conclusions. 
2. Reification and Truthmaking 
 
Before illustrating our theory, let us briefly clarify some terminological issues con-
cerning reification and relationships. In general, reification is the process of including 
a certain entity in the domain of discourse. For example, Davidson's move of putting 
events in the domain of discourse [6] is a reification move. Also, when we ascribe 
metaproperties like symmetry to a binary relation such as married with, we are reify-
ing the whole relation (intended as a set of tuples). This is different from reifying a 
single instance of a relation, say the single tuple <John, Mary>, and is also different 
from reifying the result of a nominalization process of the relation's predicate holding 
for that tuple, namely the marriage between John and Mary. The latter, and not the 
tuple, is what we call a relationship. 
Note that such understanding of a relationship deviates from the mainstream, since 
Chen defines a relationship type as a mathematical relation (i.e. a set of tuples), and a 
relationship as one of such tuples. So, under the mainstream approach relations (rela-
tionship types) and relationships are extensional notions. Yet, Chen admits that dif-
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ferent relationship types (say, friend of and colleague of) may involve the same tu-
ples, so each relationship type seems to have a unique "meaning" (its intension) con-
veyed by its name3. We claim that it is this intensional aspect of a relationship that 
people have in mind, when they talk of relationship reification. This is why, for the 
sake of clarity, we prefer to use the term 'relationship' only in its intensional meaning, 
adopting 'tuple' to refer to the extension. The rest of the paper is devoted to under-
standing when it is useful and legitimate to consider such 'intensional meaning' as an 
element of our domain of discourse, and, if so, what its ontological nature is. 
2.1 Which relations deserve reification? 
In the past, a problem we encountered while developing our approach to relationships 
reification concerned the kinds of relation that deserve reification4. In the early 
Guizzardi's work, a crisp distinction was assumed between formal relations, which 
"hold between two or more entities directly without any further intervening individu-
al", and material relations, which require the existence of an intervening individual. 
The modeling proposal was to systematically introduce –for all material relations– a 
specific construct, called the relator, standing for such intervening individual. Note 
that comparative relations such as taller than were considered by Guizzardi as for-
mal, because they hold just in virtue of the intrinsic properties of the relata.  
   In the philosophical literature, however, the formal/material distinction varies sig-
nificantly among different authors, and overlaps with other distinctions. The defini-
tion of formal (vs. material) relations adopted by Guizzardi is indeed equivalent to 
one of the various definitions proposed in the literature to account for internal (vs. 
external) relations. We report here the one by Peter Simons, based in turn on Moore 
[10]: “If it is possible that a and b both exist and it not be the case that aRb, then if 
aRb we say the relational predication is true externally. If it is not possible that a and 
b both exist and it not be the case that aRb, then where aRb we say the relational 
predication is true internally" ([8], p. 203). 
According to this definition, as Simons observes, comparative relational predica-
tions go across the internal/external distinction: some of them turn out to be internal 
(and therefore formal, in Guizzardi's terminology), but others turn out to be external, 
and therefore material. For instance, the mere existence of an electron e and a proton 
p is enough to conclude that heavier(p, e) holds (since both of them have that particu-
lar mass essentially), but the mere existence of John and Mary is not enough to con-
clude that taller(John, Mary) holds, since they don't have that particular height essen-
tially, so something else is required. Moreover, notice that, within the same relation, 
some predications –like heavier(p, e)– may be true internally, while others –like heav-
                                                            
3 Another way to capture this meaning is to add attributes to the original tuple, which somehow 
express the properties the relationship has. This is the approach followed by Thalheim [7], who 
defines a relationship type as a sequence of entity types followed by a set of attributes. 
4 By 'a relation that deserves reification' we mean a relation that deserves reification of its rela-
tionships. Informally, we talk of reification of a relation to mean reification of its relationships. 
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ier(John, Mary)5– may be true externally. So, the picture is rather complicated, and 
this is the reason why, in our previous paper, we decided to abandon the for-
mal/material distinction and just focus on a relevant class of relations that certainly 
deserve reification, those we called extrinsic relations, without taking a position on 
the reification of intrinsic relations, to which comparative relations belong.  
In short, an intrinsic relation is a relation that can be derived from the intrinsic 
properties of its relata6. This clearly applies to all comparative relations (whether or 
not they depend on the mere existence of their relata), as well as to all relations that 
just depend on the mere existence of their relata. Extrinsic relations are just the rela-
tions that are not intrinsic: for example, you can't decide whether married(John, 
Mary) holds just on the basis of the intrinsic properties of John and Mary. 
Interestingly enough, in philosophy there is another way of defining the inter-
nal/external distinction, owed to Armstrong [9], according to which 'internal' and 
'external' become synonymous, respectively, of 'intrinsic' and 'extrinsic'7. So, in retro-
spective, we can conclude that, although Guizzardi's definition was following Simons, 
what he actually had in mind –especially while insisting on considering comparative 
relations as formal– was Armstrong's distinction. 
That said, still we have to answer our original question: which relations deserve re-
ification? Elsewhere [1, 2, 12] we have discussed extensively the practical advantages 
of the relator construct in the practice of conceptual modeling, so no doubt that most 
extrinsic relations (i.e., those Guizzardi labeled material relations) deserve reification. 
But are we sure that comparative relations don't deserve reification? For instance, one 
may want to keep track of the difference in height between him and his son, or may 
measure the extent of a temperature difference between two bodies. In general, we 
may be interested in talking of qualitative relationships among things: we can have 
temperature relationships, size relationships, mass relationships, so that we can say 
that the mass relationship between the Earth and the Moon is responsible of the way 
they move around. 
In the light of these examples, our position is that, besides extrinsic relations, also 
comparative relations may deserve reification. But what do they have in common? 
Our answer is that they both belong to the broad class of what we call descriptive 
relations, which hold in virtue of some particular aspect (some individual qualities) 
of their relata. Under this view, both taller than and being in love with count as de-
scriptive.  
                                                            
5 Of course, one could consider heavier(John@t,Mary@t) to be a relation between the states 
(snapshots) of John and Mary at t. In this case, the relation would hold internally if at all.  
6 We shall take the notion of intrinsic property as primitive. Intuitively, an intrinsic property is 
a property that holds for an entity independently of the existence of any other entity. 
7 See the recent overview by MacBride [11] of the various philosophical positions on relations. 
According to him, there are three ways of understanding the internal/external distinction: "in-
ternal relations are determined by the mere existence of the things they relate, or internal rela-
tions are determined by the intrinsic characters of the things they relate, or internal relations 
supervene upon the intrinsic characters of the things they relate". The first position (adopted by 
Simons) is due to Moore. The second one is due to Armstrong, while the third one to Lewis. 
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Note that descriptive/non-descriptive and intrinsic/extrinsic are orthogonal distinc-
tions. The general picture is reported in Fig. 1, where we have shown how internal 
relations (in Moore's sense) go across the descriptive/non-descriptive distinction, 
while being included in the class of intrinsic relations. Let us briefly discuss the four 
quadrants shown in this figure. Intrinsic descriptive relations include all comparative 
relations holding among objects and events, plus for example all relations of mutual 
spatial location (at least as long we consider spatial location as an intrinsic property). 
Intrinsic non-descriptive relations include internal relations such as existential de-
pendence and resemblance, which hold in virtue of the mere existence of their relata, 
as well as all comparative relations holding among tropes and qualities. Altogether, 
exactly because they do not depend on particular aspects of their relata, they may be 
called formal relations (abandoning therefore the notion of 'formal' as synonyms of 
'internal'), in the sense that their domain and range are not limited to specific domains. 
The figure shows that not all formal relations are internal: for instance, necessary part 
of would be internal, while contingent part of would be external. Extrinsic descriptive 
relations include relations such as works for and married to that hold in virtue of 
some actual qualities of their relata, but also historical relations such as author of, 
which hold in virtue of some past quality (of the author). Finally, extrinsic non-
descriptive relations include merely historical relations such as born in, that holds in 
virtue of an event occurred in the past, and the so-called Cambridge relations such as 
being both observed by somebody, which hold in virtue of something external that 
doesn't affect the relata.  
 
Figure 1. Kinds of relations. 
In conclusion, to decide whether a relation deserves or not reification we need to 
check whether it is a descriptive relation or not, i.e., whether it holds in virtue of some 
individual qualities of its relata. Individual qualities, originally introduced in the 
DOLCE ontology [13], are now a common feature (with minor differences) of other 
top-level ontologies such as UFO [2] and BFO [14]. In the following, we shall see 
how individual qualities capture the notion of truthmaking, accounting not only for 
the truth of a relational predication, but also for the way a relationship behaves in 
time. In short, we shall see how individual qualities constitute relationships. 
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2.3 Weak truthmaking 
In our earlier paper [1], we based our re-visitation of Guizzardi's original idea of rela-
tors on the philosophical notion of truthmaking. In that paper, we did not take a posi-
tion concerning the specific nature of such notion, just assuming that truthmaking is a 
primitive, fundamental relation linking what is true to what exists. In general, a shared 
intuition is that a truthmaker for a property or a relation is an entity in virtue of which 
that property or relation holds. Several attempts have been made by philosophers to 
formally capture such intuition [15], i.e., to account for what 'in virtue of' means. Ac-
cording to the mainstream doctrine, the truthmaker of a proposition is something 
whose very existence entails that the proposition is true. This means that the truthmak-
ing relation holds necessarily. There is, however, a weaker notion of truthmaking, 
introduced by Josh Parsons [16], according to which the truthmaker of a proposition 
is something that makes the proposition true not just because of its existence (i.e., 
because of its essential nature), but because of the way it contingently is (i.e., because 
of its actual nature). The truthmaking relation does therefore hold contingently. This 
notion of weak truthmaking is the one we shall adopt here, since –as we shall see– it 
seems to be the most apt to support our view of (descriptive) relationships as entities 
that can change in time, accounting not only for the fact that a relation holds, but also 
for the way it holds and develops in time.  
In the following, we shall illustrate such a view by considering three main cases of 
descriptive relations: descriptive properties (i.e., descriptive monadic relations), in-
trinsic descriptive relations, and extrinsic descriptive relations. While in our previous 
paper we only focused on the third case, we believe that considering the former two 
cases is illuminating in developing a general theory of truthmaking and reification. 
2.4 Descriptive properties and weak truthmaking 
Consider a simple proposition involving a descriptive property, such as this rose is 
red. What is its truthmaker? According to the mainstream theory, an answer8 is that it 
is a trope, i.e., particularized redness property. We consider it as an object-like entity, 
a kind of disposition to interact with the world that is existentially dependent on the 
rose (it inheres in the rose). Under this view, a redness event is not a trope, but rather 
a manifestation of a redness trope. Both the trope and the redness event, because of 
their very existence, are such that the proposition is true. They are therefore both 
truthmakers of that proposition. Since the trope participates to the redness event we 
consider it as as the minimal truthmaker, although we are aware that a precise account 
of the notion of minimal truthmaking is still under discussion9. 
                                                            
8Another answer could be that the truthmaker is a fact of redness. In light of the discussion in 
[1] against facts as a viable interpretation for relationships, we do not consider this option here.  
9 For our purposes, we define a minimal truthmaker of a proposition as a truthmaker such that 
no entity inhering in it, being part of it or participating to it is itself a truthmaker of the same 
proposition. 
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Suppose now that the rose is red at time t1, and becomes brown after several days, 
at time t2. According to the mainstream theory, the truthmaker at t2 will be a different 
one, namely a specific brownness. According to Parsons' theory, instead, the weak 
truthmaker at both times is the rose itself: it is the very same rose, because of the way 
it is at t1 and at t2, that is a truthmaker of 'this rose is red' at t1 and a truthmaker of 
'this rose is brown' at t2. In other words, a weak truthmaker is something such that, 
because of the way it is, makes a proposition true.  
We should observe, however, that the rose is not the minimal weak truthmaker of 
these propositions. There is something smaller –so to speak– than the whole rose: the 
rose's color. Indeed, it is exactly because of the rose's color that the rose is red at t1 
and brown at t2. As we mentioned above, this color is modeled as an individual quali-
ty in the DOLCE and UFO ontologies10. A peculiar characteristic of individual quali-
ties is that they are endurants, i.e., they can qualitatively change in time (e.g., change 
their “value” from red to brown) while maintaining their identity.11 
In conclusion, individual qualities are the minimal weak truthmakers of simple 
propositions involving a descriptive property. So to speak, they are responsible for the 
truth of such propositions, in the precise sense –as explained by Parsons– that the 
proposition can't become false without an intrinsic change of its weak truthmaker, i.e., 
since the weak truthmaker is an individual quality, without a movement in the space 
of possible values such quality can assume [13]. So, as we have seen, the same quality 
can be responsible for the truth of different propositions holding at different times. 
Let us see now how the weak truthmaking mechanism described above can be used 
to establish an ontological foundation for reification choices in the practice of concep-
tual modeling. The practical rule we suggest is: "Whenever a model includes a de-
scriptive property, typically represented by an instance attribute of a class, one 
should reflect on the possibility of reifying it as an individual quality". 
Suppose for example that, in an employment scenario, we have the attribute mood 
for the Employee class, with possible values happy or sad; reifying the mood quality 
as a separate class (whose instances inhere to the instances of Employee) would allow 
you the possibility to express, for instance: (1) Further details on the reified entity: 
“Mary has a pleasant mood”; (2) Information on its temporal behavior: “Mary’s 
mood got much worse in the last days”;  (3) Information on its causal interactions 
with the world: “Because of Mary’s mood, she wasn’t very productive at work”. As 
we shall see, these are indeed the main reasons for the reification of descriptive  rela-
tions of arbitrary arity, not just descriptive properties. 
Note that, strictly speaking, we cannot say that in this way we are reifying the hap-
py and the sad properties, since the same mood quality may "reify" both of them at 
different times. A strict reification would result in the explicit introduction of a specif-
ic happiness and a specific sadness, intended as completely determined particularized 
                                                            
10 We shall not discuss the differences among these ontologies concerning the notion of quality. 
In particular, we shall ignore the fact that DOLCE does not consider qualities as endurants, and 
we shall collapse, for the sake of simplicity, UFO’s distinction between qualities and modes. 
11 This notion of individual qualities as endurants is similar to Moltmann’s variable tropes. 
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properties, which would be tropes and not qualities. In this case, however, as dis-
cussed by Moltmann [17] and in our earlier paper, we would loose the flexibility of 
expressing the additional information described above. So, we may consider the strat-
egy outlined above as a weak reification strategy, which turns out, however, to be 
more effective in practice than a strict reification strategy. 
3. Descriptive relations and weak truthmaking 
3.1 Intrinsic descriptive relations 
Having described the truthmaking mechanism for descriptive properties, let us now 
generalize it to descriptive relations, considering first the intrinsic ones, and in partic-
ular comparative relations. Take for example taller(John, Mary). In the light of the 
previous discussion, it is easy to see that its minimal weak truthmaker is the mereo-
logical sum12 of two individual qualities, namely John’s height and Mary’s height. 
Similarly to what is noted above, should the height relationship between John and 
Mary change in a certain way, this would be also the weak truthmaker of as-tall-
as(John, Mary) and taller(Mary, John). In our view, this means that there is a single 
entity in our ontology, namely a height relationship, consisting of a quality complex 
having the two individual heights as proper parts. Such a relationship is an endurant, 
whose internal configuration may be such that one of the three possible propositions 
above is true at a given time. 
 In conclusion, we can say that comparative relationships (as mereological sums of 
intrinsic qualities) are the weak truthmakers of comparative relations. Reifying them 
has the same advantages we have seen above in terms of the possibility to add further 
details: for instance, we can express the actual height-distance between the two relata 
as a property of the relationship (which in principle may itself be reified, originating a 
height-distance individual quality inhering in the quality complex). 
 Note that the approach described above can be generalized to the case of relations 
expressing arbitrary configurations of intrinsic qualities, such as weights or colors. If 
we consider spatial position also an intrinsic quality (as done in DOLCE, although the 
choice might be debatable), then relations describing spatial configurations (patterns) 
may be also be reified in terms of quality complexes. 
3.2 Extrinsic descriptive relations  
Considering now extrinsic descriptive relations, their main difference from the intrin-
sic ones is that at least one of the qualities inhering in the two relata is a relational 
one, which is existentially dependent on the other one(s). Take for example lo-
ves(John, Mary). Its weak truthmaker is a quality complex that includes John’s love 
towards Mary (a mental disposition understood as a relational quality), and whatever 
other quality (relational or non-relational) it  actually depends on (such as Mary’s 
                                                            
12The mereological sum of x and y is an entity z such that whatever overlaps z also overlaps x or 
y (see, for instance, [2], chapter 5) 
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beauty) or depends on it (such as Mary’s embarassement in reaction to John’s love). 
The internal structure of such quality complex has been discussed in detail in [1]. 
 Note that, as we have seen, the same relationship (i.e., the same weak truthmaker) 
may make different kinds of relational propositions true. Indeed, at different times, 
we can describe it in different ways: as a mutual love, as a non-mutual-love, as a pas-
sionate love, as a mostly inexistent love, etc. All the corresponding propositions 
would share the same weak truthmaker, i.e., the same love relationship exhibiting 
qualitative changes in time.   
4. Relationships and their context: scenes and events 
Let us shift now our attention to events. In our earlier papers, as more or less custom-
ary in the philosophical literature, we used the term ‘event’ in its most general sense, 
i.e., as a synonym of perdurant or occurrent (contrasted respectively with endurant 
and continuant). Here, while describing the interplay between events and relation-
ships, we shall reserve this term for a more specific use. Shortly put, events emerge 
from scenes; individual qualities and relationships are the focus of events.  
4.1 Scenes 
The Cambridge dictionary defines a scene as "a part of a play or film in which the 
action stays in one place for a continuous period of time". Of course the word has 
several more meanings, but this is the one that fits best the technical notion we would 
like to introduce. For us, a scene is whatever happens in a suitably restricted spatio-
temporal region. Our intuition is that a scene is a perdurant of a particular kind, being 
the object of a unitary perception act. So, its main characteristic is that it is a whole, 
from a perceptual point of view. We leave it open what the specific unity conditions 
for this whole are. A scene may last a few milliseconds, corresponding to a "one shot" 
presentation, or perhaps a whole life, if we see it as a macroscopic perception act. The 
important facts are: (1) A scene cannot be instantaneous: it always has a time dura-
tion bound to the intrinsic time granularity and temporal integration mechanisms of 
the perception system considered (we do not perceive the single frames of a movie, 
nor the internal dynamics of a sound); (2) A scene is located in a convex region of 
spacetime. It occurs in a certain place, during a continuous interval of time. 
In conclusion, we see a scene as a maximal perdurant located in a convex region of 
spacetime: it contains all perdurants occurring there as parts. For example, consider 
Davidson's example [6] of a sphere rotating and heating up during a certain time in-
terval. What the example describes is a scene, including whatever occurs in that time 
interval within the spatial location delimited by the sphere's surface. In the next sec-
tion we shall see how two further perdurants (events, in the strong sense defended 
here) can be distinguished as proper parts of that scene. 
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4.2 Events 
The etymology of the term 'event' is from Latin: ex-venire (to come out). If we take 
this etymology seriously, we have to ask where do events come from. Our answer is 
that they come from scenes: they emerge from scenes through a focusing process. We 
claim that all ordinary events, like those described by most natural language verbs, 
have a focus. This means that their participants are not involved in the event, so to 
speak, in an homogeneous way, but rather there are different levels of involvement, 
which concern also their parts and qualities. So we can distinguish some core partici-
pants, and others that are not involved at all in the event, except in a very indirect 
way. For example, consider a person writing. Her body clearly participates to this 
process, but some of its parts (say, the eyes) are clearly more involved than others 
(say, the mouth). Should the same person be writing while eating a sandwich, the 
mouth would be involved in the eating and not in the writing. 
Consider now a scene we can perceive from a house window: a simple one like a 
meadow in a sunny day, or a more complex one like a busy street market in a working 
day. Several events may capture our attention: a butterfly passing by, a cloud showing 
a particular shape for a while, a person buying some food, a vendor yelling… So, we 
may say that many events emerge from the same scene, each one with different focus.  
But what is this focus, exactly? One way of seeing it is as a minimal participant to 
that event. For instance, consider Titanic's collision with an iceberg, discussed by 
Borghini and Varzi [18]: of course there are large parts of the ship (say, the rear part) 
and large parts of the iceberg that are loosely involved in the event, while other parts 
(a suitable part of the iceberg and a suitable part of Titanic) are definitely involved. 
These would be the minimal participants. However, as discussed there, serious prob-
lems of vagueness and indeterminacy would emerge: how to select such minimal par-
ticipants? As they put it, "Exactly what parts of Titanic hit what parts of the iceberg?" 
In our view, a way to address this problem is to shift our attention from the partici-
pants to their qualities: for example, we can say that, for sure, the Titanic's mass and 
the iceberg's mass were involved in the event, while, for sure, the Titanic's color and 
the iceberg's color were not involved. Of course, vagueness and indeterminacy prob-
lems cannot be completely eliminated, since, for instance, determining the exact loca-
tion of the hit event would still be a problem. However, for the purpose of extracting 
an event from a scene, we claim that pointing to some objects' qualities is enough to 
describe exactly the event we want to talk of, i.e., to let it emerge from the scene. 
In other words, an event is determined by a couple <r, f>, where r is a spatiotem-
poral region, and f is the event's focus, consisting of a collection of individual quali-
ties, which we shall call focal qualities. To see this, consider again the example of the 
sphere that rotates while heating up: assuming that r is the spatiotemporal region oc-
cupied by the sphere during this phenomenon, we can isolate the focus of the rotation 
event in a collection of individual qualities, namely the spatial locations of the sphere 
parts, while the focus of the heating event is clearly the sphere’s temperature. In other 
words, if we have two different foci, we have two different events emerging from the 
same scene, each one with different sums of qualities as a focus. 
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In conclusion, what we suggest is to stop considering ‘event' as synonymous of 
'perdurant', but rather distinguish two broad categories within perdurants, depending 
on whether they have a focus or not. The former will be events (in this new strict 
sense), the latter scenes. The reason they are different lies in their different principle 
of individuation: two different scenes must have a different spatiotemporal location, 
while two different events may share the same spatiotemporal location. So, to quote 
an observation by Quine [19], if the sphere is rotating rapidly and heating slowly, we 
have an event that is rapid and a different one that is slow, while if we had a single 
event of course we couldn't say it is both rapid and slow. 
This way of considering events allows therefore for a very fine-grained approach: 
an event is whatever happens to a suitably selected set of individual qualities in a par-
ticular spatiotemporal region. So, the simplest event we can describe (and imagine) 
would be a change (or a state) of a single individual quality, say a light's intensity 
changing from dark to bright, or remaining bright for a while. Indeed, in our view 
events are manifestations of individual qualities. 
4.3 Reifying events as the context of relationships 
Let us now go back to relationships. We have advocated the view that the focus of an 
event is a sum of individual qualities. In the case of relational events, i.e., events in-
volving multiple participants, this sum of individual qualities is typically constituted 
by relational qualities inhering in the multiple involved participants. These relational 
qualities form quality complexes that are reified relationships. Consider for instance, 
on one hand, the marriage between John and Mary as a relationship and, on the other 
hand, the event (the marriage process) that is the sum of the manifestations of the 
qualities (e.g., commitments and claims) constituting this relationship. We can see 
such event as carved out of a broader scene, involving John and Mary’s lives, by hav-
ing the marriage relationship as the focus. Analogously, Barack Obama’s presidential 
mandate relationship would be the focus of Obama’s term, while Paul’s enrollment 
relationship to the University of Trento would be the focus of Paul’s student life in 
the scope of that enrollment. All these events are carved out of complex extended 
scenes by being the manifestation of qualities that constitute their focal relationships.  
Now, if every relational event such as the ones just described has relationships as 
focus, wouldn't be enough to just reify these relationships? In other words, what is the 
practical relevance of having also events, besides relationships, in our domain of dis-
course? A first reason is to make clear what the role of the relata is. Consider for in-
stance a service offering relationship, which in a recent paper [20] we modeled as a 
complex sum of commitments and claims. Intuitively, a service offering has an agent, 
who is the provider, and a beneficiary, who is the customer. But the provider is not 
the agent of the relationship. He is the agent of an offering event. Indeed, roles are 
usually understood as ways of participation13 to an event. So, being the agent of an 
offering event means having a commitment that is part of the focus of that event. 
                                                            
13 We understand participation as a formal relation linking endurants to perdurants [13]. 
 12 
A second reason to have events in a conceptual model is the possibility to talk of 
the broader context of the relationship. Coming back to the example mentioned in the 
Introduction, consider a works-for relationship, modeled as a sum of duties and 
claims. If we want to express a constrain concerning the location where the work oc-
curs (say, a particular office) we cannot just add an attribute to the relationship, since 
such location is not directly involved in the relationship, but rather it is a participant 
of the event focused on by the relationship. Indeed, the point is exactly that there are 
much more participants involved in a working event than those directly involved in 
the relationship: the job of the relationship is just to focus on the core participants 
(picking up some of their specific qualities). Thus, if we want to be able to talk of the 
other participants, we need both the relationship and the event.  
A third reason is that we need events if we want to talk of specific temporal con-
straints concerning the way a relationship evolves in time. For instance, to express the 
constraints concerning the weekly schedule, we may need to introduce specific events 
corresponding to working slots as proper parts of the main event focused by the 
works-for relationship: duties and obligations usually hold for a continuous interval of 
time, while the working slots are not contiguous. 
Finally, we may need to explicitly modeling events while dealing with extrinsic 
non-descriptive relations, especially merely historical relations such as born-in. Being 
non-descriptive, such relation does not need to be reified as such (we could say it is a 
relation without a relationship), but yet modeling the born event may have several 
practical advantages. 
5. Final Considerations 
In previous work [2,4,5], we have shown how reified relationships are essential for 
addressing many classical and recurrent modeling problems, how their explicit repre-
sentation has a direct impact on the domain expert’s understanding of the real-world 
semantics [12], and how they may help avoiding a number of occurrences of anti-
patterns in the modeling of relations [21]. In our view, the work we presented here 
sheds new light both to the theory and the practice of reification, by clarifying which 
relationships deserve reification in the framework of a general ontological theory of 
reification and truthmaking, by clarifying the nature of descriptive relationships as 
quality complexes that can change in time, and by establishing a systematic, princi-
pled connection between relationships reification and events reification. The novel 
understanding of events we have proposed, where events emerge from scenes by 
means of a focusing mechanism based on relationships, further clarifies the whole 
picture, and gives us –we believe– the right tools to model complex scenes involving 
multiple emerging events.  
We are aware that we still need a complete formal characterization of our theory. 
However, we believe the conceptual clarifications present in this paper are a first step 
to establish solid foundations for practical applications both in knowledge representa-
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